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The Company They Keep 
Founders' Models for Organizing New Firms 
M . D I A N E B U R T O N 
In starting a company, entrepreneurs pursue courses of action that, inten-
tionally or unintentionally, embody different assumptions about the nature of 
work, the nature of people, the appropriate bases for attaching people to 
organizations, and the best methods for controlling and coordinating work. 
Such differing premises lead entrepreneurs to build different types of firms, 
particularly with respect to the employment relationship. Early employment-
related choices—which crystallize organizational culture, authority relations, 
and routines concerning work—are among the most difficult to undo (Han-
nan and Freeman 1984). Furthermore, there is ample empirical evidence 
demonstrating that decisions about whom to employ and how to organize 
their work is related to the earliest viability of a firm (Boeker 1988; Cooper, 
Gimeno-Gascon, and Woo 1994; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1990; 
MacMillan, Siegel, and Subba Narasimha 1985). Yet despite consensus that 
these early employment-related choices are important, there has been litde sys-
tematic research on the factors that influence founders' decisions. Instead, most 
research on how founders launch new ventures has emphasized the entrepre-
neurs strategies for products, markets, technology, operations, and finance 
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• i also benefited greatly from discussions with and comments from Karen Aschaffenburg, 
1Un N o h r i a> Mike Tushman, Marc Ventresca, and Stephanie Woerner. 
13 
14 I BURTON 
(e.g., Romanelli 1989a). Yet a new venture's capacity to recruit the appropri-
ate people and build an effective organization around them arguably has as 
much if not more to do with ultimate success (Stinchcombe 1965). 
In making organizational and employment-related decisions, founders nec-
essarily rely on a mental model of the correct and appropriate ways to orga-
nize and to manage (DiMaggio 1997; Fligstein 1990; Karpik 1978). These 
models are culturally and historically situated prescriptions for organizing and 
managing (Barley and Kunda 1992; Guillen 1994). Organizational theory 
provides a strong prediction that, taking into account the environmental con-
ditions facing the firm (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) and the technical demands 
of the task (Thompson 1967; Woodward 1965), there will be a dominant 
model, especially within the boundaries of a particular industry (DiMaggio 
and Powell 1983). Interestingly, despite this prediction, observers have found 
different employment models across seemingly similar firms (Applebaum and 
Batt 1994; Henderson and Cockburn 1994; Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 
1992). The question of what accounts for this heterogeneity is largely unan-
swered (Romanelli 1991). An important first step is to understand different 
mental models and their sources. 
Although extant theory implies that organizations founded at particular 
times in particular industries tend to exhibit similar employment models, 
differences in founders' educational and employment experiences may produce 
diversity in their understanding of what the normative employment models 
are. Novel models may arise by accident, invented by those who are either 
inexperienced or disconnected or both (March and Olsen 1976; Hannan and 
Freeman 1989). Alternatively, founders might intentionally deviate from the 
normative models because of unhappy experiences. They may also strategically 
avoid such models out of a belief than an atypical employment model may lead 
to competitive advantages. Thus, novel models may arise when leaders believe 
that they can prosper by deliberately choosing a distinctive approach to orga-
nizing and managing (DiMaggio 1988; Fligstein 1987; Schein 1983). With-
out a clear understanding of how variation in employment models arises, we 
cannot begin to understand how particular choices may relate to the devel-
opment of the firm or to its performance. 
This chapter examines the employment models founders use as they begin 
to construct new firms. The empirical setting is a sample of emerging high-
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technology firms in Silicon Valley. This chapter focuses on two questions: (1) 
Why are new firms founded under different conceptual models? and (2) What 
are the factors that lead a founding team to espouse a particular employment 
model? 
Nascent organizations, start-ups, are ideal subjects for studying variations 
in employment models. The founding team members must immediately make 
a series of staffing and organization-building decisions that necessarily embody 
the employment relationship. Moreover, in a new firm, the choices are not lim-
ited by prior decisions nor do they build on existing policies; instead, the deci-
sions arise directly from the founders' mental models. The initial employment 
model and the organizational strategy are simultaneously set as a firm is 
founded; thus, one can examine contemporaneous associations without con-
cern for causality. Finally, because new firms have not yet established either a 
reputation or a track record, they depend on external ties to provide both 
resources and legitimacy (Starr and Macmillan 1990). Because of this depen-
dency, new firms may be especially receptive to external influences that impose 
normative models (Scott 1995). 
EMPLOYMENT MODELS IN START-UPS 
The data for this chapter come from information collected as part of the 
Stanford Project on Emerging Companies (SPEC).1 SPEC is a panel study 
examining the founding conditions, the evolution of employment practices, 
organizational designs, and business strategies, and the longer-term conse-
quences of early organization building in a sample of 173 young high-tech-
nology firms in Silicon Valley. The firms in the study were founded between 
1982 and 1994 and had at least 10 employees at the time of sampling in 
1994-95. 
The design of the SPEC study deliberately narrows some of the possible 
sources of variation in founders' models. For example, focusing on firms in a 
single region and sector of economic activity necessarily controls for labor mar-
1. The description draws heavily from published research papers by M. Diane Burton, James Baron, 
Michael Hannan, and others affiliated with the Stanford Project on Emerging Companies (SPEC). 
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ket and environmental conditions, as well as for some of the institutional influ-
ences asserted to shape organizations. There are other reasons to expect a great 
deal of homogeneity in organizational models among young Silicon Valley 
technology companies. Compared with the economy as a whole, the tasks of 
high-technology companies are relatively similar. For the most part, firms in 
Silicon Valley are subject to the same state and regional legal and regulatory 
environment. The accessibility of capital and the tightly interconnected infra-
structure of service providers such as lawyers, headhunters, accountants, and 
consultants that fuel the start-up creation process should, in theory, create rel-
atively standardized organizations (cf. Suchman 1994a). All of the firms are in 
rapidly changing environments, and all of them are critically dependent on 
technical talent, a resource that tends to be in short supply. Both employees 
and founders in Silicon Valley are highly mobile (Rogers and Larsen 1984; 
Saxenian 1994). 
Prior SPEC research has demonstrated that there is heterogeneity in 
founders' employment models. Researchers have identified archetypal employ-
ment models that are associated with distinctive human resources practices 
(Baron, Burton, and Hannan 1996) and that predict subsequent organiza-
tional development, including the timing of an initial public stock offering, the 
transition to a non-founder CEO (Hannan, Burton, and Baron 1996), the 
amount of managerial and administrative overhead (Baron, Hannan, and 
Burton 1999), and the extent of bureaucratization (Baron, Burton, and Han-
nan 1999). This prior research documents that the employment models are 
real: they are empirically observable and have measurable and predictable 
consequences for firms. This chapter zsstssts whether there is a dominant 
model within particular industry segments and attempts to identify the factors 
that account for conformity to or deviance from what may be normatively 
prescribed. 
The primary data for this chapter come from open-ended interviews that 
I and several research associates conducted with founders. These interviews 
typically lasted 60 minutes, during which time the founder was first asked to 
describe the impetus for forming a company, how the founding team was put 
together, and the planned source of competitive advantage. Each founder was 
then asked whether he or she had "an organizational model or blueprint in 
mind" when he or she founded the company. Founders described models ret-
rospectively in the conte 
tions and probes were or 
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Detailed qualitative analysis of the transcripts revealed three recurring 
dimensions along which founders' descriptions varied: (1) the nature of the 
employees' attachment to the firm, (2) the basis for selecting new employees, 
and (3) the mode of coordinating and controlling work (for additional details, 
see Burton 1995). 
Attachment. Founders articulated three different bases of employees' attach-
ment: love, work, and money. Some founders envisioned creating a strong 
family-like feeling and an intense emotional bond with the workforce that 
would inspire superior effort and help retain highly sought employees. In 
these firms, what binds the employee is a sense of personal belonging and iden-
tification with the company that is labeled love. Other founders believed that 
the primary motivator for their employees was the desire to work at the tech-
nological frontier. These founders relied on providing interesting and chal-
lenging work as the basis for attracting, motivating, and perhaps retaining 
employees. Finally, other founders stated that they regarded the employment 
relationship as a simple exchange of labor for money. 
Selection. Founders described three bases for selecting employees: skills, 
potential, and fit. Some founders seemed to think of the firm as a bundle of 
tasks and sought employees with the requisite skills and experience needed to 
accomplish some immediate tasks. Other founders focused less on immediate 
and well-defined tasks than on a series of projects, often not yet even envi-
sioned, through which employees would move over time. Accordingly, they 
focused on long-term potential. Finally, another group of founders focused 
primarily on values or cultural fit and placed heavy emphasis on how a 
prospective hire would connect with others in the organization. 
Mode of coordination and control. The most common blueprint for con-
trolling and coordinating work involved extensive reliance on informal 
control through peers or the organizational culture. Other founders appeared 
to take for granted the fact that workers were committed to excellence in their 
work and could perform at high levels because they had been professionally 
socialized to do so. Professional control emphasizes autonomy and inde-
pendence, rather than inculturation, and founders using this approach tended 
to recruit high-potential individuals from elite institutions. A third group of 
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founders espoused a more traditional view of control as being embedded in 
formal procedures and systems. Finally, some founders stated that they 
intended to control and coordinate work personally, by direct oversight, rem-
iniscent of the simple control paradigm that Edwards (1979) identified as 
characteristic of small capitalist firms in the late-nineteenth and early twen-
tieth century. 
Founders' employment models are made up of one of three possible vari-
ants of both attachment and selection and one of four possible variants of con-
trol, yielding the potential for 3 X 3 X 4 = 36 unique employment models. But 
iterative inductive analyses of the interview transcripts suggested that founders 
drew on a small number of salient cultural institutions—universities and 
research laboratories, project teams, traditional hierarchies, and communi-
ties—to describe their models, and many of the observations in the SPEC 
sample cluster into five of the 36 cells, which neatly correspond to the cultural 
institutions and account for 57% (88 of 154) of the ventures.2 Table 2.1 
shows these basic archetypal models, which are here labeled engineering, star, 
commitment, bureaucracy, and autocracy, with their corresponding dimen-
sions and prevalence in the sample. 
Each of the archetypal models exemplifies a well-understood mode of 
organizing. The engineering model, which involves attachment through chal-
lenging work, peer-group control, and selection based on specific task abilities, 
resembles a task-focused project team. The star model resembles the organiz-
ing mode of science and academia, wherein attachment derives from chal-
lenging work, there is a reliance on autonomy and professional control, and 
personnel are selected based on their long-term potential. The commitment 
model is family-like and relies on emotional attachments of employees to the 
organization, selection based on cultural fit, and peer-group control. The 
bureaucracy model is a modern, rationalized, organization and involves attach-
ment based on providing challenging work and/or opportunities for develop-
ment, selecting individuals based on their qualifications for a particular role, 
and relying on formalized control. Finally, the autocracy model is reminiscent 
Five Archetypal Ei 
Dimensions 
ATTACHMENT 
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Work 
Love 
Work 
Money 
S E L E C T I O N 
Potential 
Skills 
Fit 
Skills 
Skills 
2. We were able to code the component dimensions of the founding employment model for 154 of 
the 173 firms. In some cases we were unable to interview a founder. In other cases the transcripts 
lacked sufficient detail to code reliably all three dimensions (attachment, selection, and control). 
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Table 2.1 
Five Archetypal Employment Models Based on Three Dimensions 
" • 
ATTACHMENT 
Work 
Work 
Love 
Work 
Money 
Dimensions 
S E L E C T I O N 
Potential 
Skills 
Fit 
Skills 
Skills 
C O O R D I N A T I O N / 
CONTROL 
Professional 
Peer/cultural 
Peer/cultural 
Formal 
Direct 
Employment Model 
Star 
Engineering 
Commitment 
Bureaucracy 
Autocracy 
Percent of Firms 
8.4% 
32.5% 
7.1% 
5.2% 
3.9% 
of turn-of-the-century factories, in which employment is premised on purely 
monetary motivations, control and coordination are achieved through close 
personal oversight, and employees are selected based on their ability to perform 
prespecified tasks. 
The remaining 43% of the sample—those firms that are located in one of 
the 31 cells other than the five cells representing the basic types—can be char-
acterized according to their distance from the archetypes by counting the 
number of dimensions that would need to change in order to transform a firm 
in a given cell into a basic model. For example, a firm with money as the basis 
of attachment, skill-oriented selection criteria, and formal control systems 
(money, skill, formal control) would be three dimensions from a commitment 
firm (love, fit, normative control), two dimensions from an engineering firm 
(work, skill, normative control), but only one dimension from either a bureau-
cracy (work, skill, formal control) or an autocracy (money, skill, direct control). 
Under this formulation, one can argue that virtually all of the firms in the 
SPEC sample are conceptually close to at least one of the five basic models. 
Eighty-eight of the 154 firms (57%) are accounted for by the basic types. 
Another 64 firms (42%) are within a single dimension of at least one basic type 
of employment model. Within this group, it is useful to differentiate hybrid 
models, those that are one dimension from two or more basic types (47 firms, 
or 31%, use hybrid models), and quasi models, those that are one dimension 
from a single basic type (15 firms, or 10%, have quasi models). Only two firms 
out of 154 (1%) are aberrant or incongruent (two dimensions away from a 
basic employment model). Table 2.2 presents a diagram of all 36 cells indi-
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eating the distance of each model from basic employment models as well as 
counts of the number of firms in each cell. 
From the numbers in Table 2.2, one might conclude that the engineering 
model is dominant in Silicon Valley—nearly one-third of the firms exhibit 
basic engineering models and an additional third (50 of 154) are within a sin-
gle dimension of the engineering model. But what of the remaining third of 
the firms? A closer examination of the firms' environment or strategy may 
account for such model variations without having to take into account the 
unique biography of each firm, as Kimberly and Bouchikhi (1995) suggested, 
because the SPEC sample design controls for history and geography. The 
most salient environmental feature is the industry, and although all of the 
SPEC firms are technology related, they operate in different industries that are 
subject to different regulatory environments and face different domestic and 
international competition. Different industries may also have different norms 
and cultures. The firms were coded into broad industry categories that capture 
the major sources of environmental variation that they faced: computer 
related, semiconductor, networking and telecommunications, medical related, 
research, and manufacturing.3 Within the SPEC sample, there is a strong 
association between the founding employment model and the firm's industry, 
as shown in Table 2.3. 
Among the 88 firms that were founded with a basic model, there appears 
to be a clear dominant archetype. For example, at least one-third of the firms 
in the electronics industries—computers (37.5%), semiconductors (37.5%), 
and networking (33.3%)—were founded with the engineering model. Over 
40% of the firms in the medical and research industries were founded under 
the star model, which resembles the universities and laboratories from which 
much of their talent is recruited. Among manufacturing firms the only arche-
type exhibited in the SPEC sample is the commitment model. In subsequent 
analyses (except one assessing the effect of strategy), industries that have the 
same dominant industry model are combined and relabeled, resulting in three 
3. These industry categories are rather coarse. For example, the medical-related industry category 
includes both medical device companies and biotechnology companies. For purposes of characteriz-
ing the environment, both types of firms are subject to regulation by the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration. In this way, they are similar to one another yet distinct from other electronics and high-tech 
companies in the sample. 
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Table 2.2 
Firm Classification According to a Three-Way Crosstabulation of 
Employment Model Dimensions (including cell counts) 
Control Selection Attachment 
Professional Skills 
Potential 
Fit 
Normative Skills 
Potential 
Fit 
Formal Skills 
Potential 
Fit 
Direct Skills 
Potential 
TOTAL AT FOUNDING 
LOVE 
0 
Unclassified 
0 
Quasi 
Star 
0 
Quasi 
Commitment 
9 
Hybrid 
Commitment/ 
Engineering 
2 
Quasi 
Commitment 
11 
Archetypal 
Commitment 
0 
Quasi 
Bureaucracy 
0 
Unclassified 
1 
Quasi 
Commitment 
2 
Quasi 
Autocracy 
0 
Unclassified 
5 
Quasi 
Commitment 
WORK 
6 
Hybrid 
Star/ 
Engineering/ 
Bureaucracy 
13 
Archetypal 
Star 
1 
Quasi 
Star 
50 
Archetypal 
Engineering 
8 
Hybrid 
Star/ 
Engineering 
9 
Hybrid 
Commitment/ 
Engineering 
8 
Archetypal 
Bureaucracy 
1 
Hybrid 
Star/Bureaucracy 
1 
Quasi 
Bureaucracy 
4 
Hybrid 
Engineer/ 
Bureaucracy/ 
Autocracy 
1 
Quasi 
Star 
0 
Unclassified 
MONEY 
2 
Quasi 
Autocracy 
0 
Quasi 
Star 
0 
Unclassified 
6 
Hybrid 
Engineering/ 
Autocracy 
0 
Unclassified 
2 
Quasi 
Commitment 
4 
Hybrid 
Bureaucracy/ 
Autocracy 
0 
Unclassified 
2 
Unclassified 
6 
Archetypal 
Autocracy 
0 
Quasi 
Autocracy 
0 
Quasi 
Autocracy 
TOTAL 
8 
13 
1 
65 
10 
22 
12 
1 
4 
12 
1 
5 
29 103 22 154 
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Table 2.3 
Industry and Archetype Model Association 
(cell counts and row percentages) 
Distance from D< 
Computer-related 
Semiconductor 
Engineering 
27 
(37.5%) 
6 
(37.5%) 
Networking and 
Telecommunications 11 
(33.3%) 
Medical related 
Research 
Manufacturing 
TOTAL 
5 
(22.7%) 
1 
(25.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
50 
(30.8%) 
Star 
2 
(2.8%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
9 
(40.9%) 
2 
(50.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
13 
(8.4%) 
Commitment 
5 
(6.9%) 
2 
(12.5%) 
2 
(6.1%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
2 
(28.6%) 
11 
(7.1%) 
Autocracy 
3 
(4.2%) 
1 
(6.3%) 
2 
(6.1%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
6 
(3.9%) 
Bureaucracy 
4 
(5.6%) 
1 
(6.3%) 
2 
(6.1%) 
1 
(4.5%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
8 
(5.2%) 
Other 
31 
(43.1%) 
6 
(37.5%) 
16 
(8.5%) 
7 
(31.8%) 
1 
(25.0%) 
5 
(71.4%) 
66 
(42.9%) 
Total 
72 
16 
33 
22 
4 
7 
154 
NOTE: Pearson chi-square = 59.08, d.f. = 25, p = .000 
broad industry categories: (1) the electronics industry (computers, semicon-
ductors, and networking firms), (2) the medical-related and research indus-
tries, and (3) the manufacturing industry. 
A closer examination of the firms that do not conform to the industry-
dominant model offers additional empirical support for dominant industry 
models. Table 2.4 reveals that excluding the firms that are founded with any 
of the five basic models, the majority of firms are conceptually close to their 
industry's dominant model: the star model for the medical-related and research 
firms, and the engineering model for companies in all other industries in the 
sample, with the exception of manufacturing. 
Nearly two-thirds of the firms (42 of 66) are within a single dimension of 
their industry's dominant model. The pattern is most pronounced in the elec-
tronics industry, in which the majority of firms not founded with one of the 
basic employment models are within one dimension of the dominant engi-
neering model. Similarly, half of the firms in the medical or research industries 
INDUSTRY 
Electronics3 
Medical-related 
or Research 
Manufacturing 
TOTAL 
INDUSTRY-
DOMINANT 
MODEL 
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44 
Star 
11 
Commitmen 
2 
57 
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1 Association 
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3 
.2%) 
1 
3%) 
2 
1%) 
0 
0%) 
0 
0%) 
0 
0%) 
6 
9%) 
Bureaucracy 
4 
(5.6%) 
1 
(6.3%) 
2 
(6.1%) 
1 
(4.5%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
8 
(5.2%) 
Other 
31 
(43.1%) 
6 
(37.5%) 
16 
(8.5%) 
7 
(31.8%) 
1 
(25.0%) 
5 
(71.4%) 
66 
(42.9%) 
Total 
72 
16 
33 
22 
4 
7 
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Table 2.4 
Distance from Dominant Employment Model by Industry Group 
INDUSTRY 
Electronics3 
Medical-related 
or Research 
Manufacturing 
TOTAL 
INDUSTRY-
DOMINANT 
MODEL 
Engineering 
44 
Star 
11 
Commitment 
2 
57 
OTHER 
ARCHETYPAL 
MODEL 
24 
7 
0 
31 
Variant 
I DIMENSION 
FROM DOMINANT 
MODEL 
36 
4 
2 
42 
"Computer related, Semiconductors, Networking, or Telecommunications 
Devian 
2 DIMENSIONS 
FROM DOMINANT 
MODEL 
12 
2 
1 
15 
3 DIMENSIONS 
FROM DOMINANT 
MODEL 
5 
2 
2 
9 
are conceptually close to the dominant star model. Just under half of the 
manufacturing firms are within a single dimension of the commitment model. 
Thus, there is empirical support for dominant organizational models within 
broadly defined industry categories. 
These industry archetypes, prevalent in the SPEC sample, also have valid-
ity from rich descriptions provided by others who have analyzed these indus-
tries. For example, medical-related firms rely heavily on scientific achieve-
ment and thus have been described as being strongly influenced by 
science-oriented cultures (Latour and Woolgar 1986; Henderson and Cock-
burn 1994; Werth 1994). The organizational model of the computer indus-
try, in which work is accomplished primarily in project teams, has been care-
fully chronicled by Kidder (1981) and Kunda (1992). Furthermore, the 
electronics industry, particularly the Silicon Valley electronics industry, has a 
distinctive and dominant cultural model that one commentator has described 
as the "triumph of the nerds" (Cringeiy 1996, 17). Some of the commonly 
described features of this Silicon Valley organizing mode include relatively flat 
organizational structures, incentive systems that encourage (rather than penal-
ize) risktaking, and team-based projects that encourage communication and 
coordination (Sager 1997). The strong technology-oriented organizational 
cultures are purported to have loose organizational boundaries, weak organi-
24 / BURTON 
zation-to-employee relationships yet strong project (or task) affiliations, and 
status hierarchies that reflect technical ability (Saxenian 1994). Finally, high-
commitment work systems, particularly for manufacturing organizations, were 
commonly described (and prescribed) by management gurus throughout 
much of the '80s and '90s (Applebaum and Batt 1994; Pfeffer 1994; Wom-
ack et al. 1990). Three factors may account for deviations from these domi-
nant models: strategy, founding team characteristics, and external partners. 
Strategy 
Organizational scholars have asserted that human resource strategy (the 
employment model) and corporate strategy should be aligned (Lawrence and 
Lorsch 1967; Nadler and Tushman 1997; Schuler 1992; Sonnenfeld and 
Peiperl 1988; Pfeffer 1994). Both strategy and the employment model are core 
features of an organization that are established early in the life cycle, are diffi-
cult to reorient, and are among the foundational characteristics that shape 
future organizational evolution (Hannan and Freeman 1984; Romanelli and 
Tushman 1994). Prior research has documented the association between strat-
egy and the employment model (Hannan, Burton, and Baron 1996); thus, it 
is both a theoretical and a logical extension to presume that within a given 
industry, some of the variation in employment models can be explained by 
differences in strategy. 
The firms in the SPEC sample varied in their dominant strategic focus. 
SPEC researchers categorized initial strategies by content by analyzing interviews 
with founders, supplemented in some cases by other sources such as newspaper 
articles, industry analysts' reports, or business plans (see Hannan, Burton, and 
Baron 1996 for more information). Founders were asked in the interviews to 
report their firms' distinctive source of competitive advantage. From their 
responses firms could be grouped into four main categories: (1) innovator, (2) 
enhancer, (3) marketer or marketing hybrid, and (4) low-cost producer. 
Innovator. Innovator firms seek competitive advantage through innovation 
or technological leadership. Such firms seek first-mover advantages by winning 
a technology race. The emphasis in these firms is on revolutionary technology, 
which often involves gaining a crucial patent or patents. Among firms in the 
SPEC study that could be classified according to the founder's human resource 
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model, roughly 50% were coded as belonging in this category, which is hardly 
surprising given the high-tech industries involved. 
Enhancer. Some firms set out to enhance existing technologies. These firms 
seek to produce a product or product line similar to those of other companies 
but make some general modification to the technology to gain competitive 
advantage. Distinctive competencies can include system integration (e.g., of 
software and hardware), superior quality (in terms of dependability or avail-
ability of features desired by customers), and the like. Just under 20% percent 
of the firms fell into the enhancer category. 
Marketer. Some of the SPEC firms planned to compete on the basis of supe-
rior sales, marketing, or customer service. Firms in the marketer category seek 
competitive advantage by developing or capitalizing on superior relations with 
customers, achieved through custom design of products, nonstandard meth-
ods of sales or distribution, or simply by developing superior capabilities in 
marketing, sales, branding, and/or customer service. Often, this strategy 
entailed firms creating products in direct response to customers' idiosyncratic 
needs, frequently working interactively with customers toward that end. In the 
SPEC sample, 13.6% were classified as having strategies driven by marketing, 
sales, and/or service. For the purposes of this chapter, an additional 10.4% of 
the sample that reported combining a marketing-service focus with an empha-
sis either on enhancing an existing technology or on technological leadership 
is included. Thus, in the SPEC sample 24% of the firms can be considered 
marketers. 
Low-cost producer. Firms that are low-cost producers seek cost advantages 
through superior production techniques, economies of scale, and the like. Only 
a small number of firms were classified as having a pure low-cost strategy, but 
several others combined an emphasis on cost minimization with some other 
focus (generally marketing or service) and were classified by the researchers into 
this category as well, resulting in a total of 7.1% of the companies. 
As is evident in Table 2.5, among the firms in the SPEC sample, there is a 
strong association between industry and strategy, and much of the statistical 
association can be accounted for by the overrepresentation of medical-related 
firms pursuing an innovator strategy and manufacturing firms pursuing a 
low-cost strategy. Despite a strong association between industry and strategy, 
however, there is also a fair amount of strategic diversity. The computer-
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Table 2.5 
Association Between Industry and Strategy Among SPEC Sample Firms 
(cell counts and row percentages) 
Computer related 
Semiconductor 
Networking and 
Telecommunications 
Medical related 
Research 
Manufacturing 
Total 
Innovator 
36 
50.0% 
8 
50.0% 
11 
33.3% 
18 
81.8% 
3 
75.0% 
76 
49.4% 
Enhancer 
16 
22.2% 
4 
25.0% 
8 
24.2% 
1 
4.5% 
1 
14.3% 
30 
19.5% 
Marketing/ 
Hybrid 
14 
19.4% 
4 
25.0% 
12 
36.4% 
3 
13.6% 
1 
25.0% 
3 
42.9% 
37 
24.0% 
Cost 
6 
8.3% 
2 
6 .1% 
3 
42.9% 
11 
7 .1% 
Total 
72 
100.0% 
16 
100.0% 
34 
100.0% 
22 
100.0% 
4 
100.0% 
7 
100.0% 
154 
100.0% 
N O T E : Pearson chi-square = 33.91, d.f. = 15, p = .004 
related and networking and telecommunications industries have firms repre-
sented in all four strategy categories. The semiconductor, medical-related, 
and manufacturing industries have firms represented in three of the four strat-
egy categories. It is only the research industry, the most sparsely represented 
industry, that exhibits limited strategic range. 
As described above, most of the high-technology firms in the SPEC sam-
ple reported pursuing a technology-driven strategy, either enhancing existing 
technology or developing innovative new technology. These firms focus on 
product development rather than organizational development and thus should 
be most likely to conform to the dominant industry model. In contrast, those 
firms founded to compete on the basis of superior sales, marketing, or service, 
or on having lower costs rely on an organizational competence to achieve their 
strategic goals, which suggests that they will pay greater attention to organi-
zational design and architecture. 
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Hypothesis 1: Firms pursuing organizational as opposed to technological 
strategies will be more likely to deviate from the industry dominant model. 
A preliminary test of this hypothesis can be done by cross-classifying strat-
egy and initial employment model by industry, given that the associations 
between strategy and industry and between industry and employment model 
are strong (see Tables 2.3 and 2.5). A more fine-grained analysis revealed that 
the overall association between strategy and employment model is modest (chi-
square = 22.75, d.f. = 15, p = .10). Within industries, however, the association 
between strategy and employment model is nonexistent, producing no statis-
tically significant associations (electronics: chi-square = 15.34, d.f. = 15, 
p = 0.43; medical: chi-square = 2.37, d.f. = 6, p = 0.88; manufacturing: chi-
square = 3.73, d.f. = 2, p = 0.12). This implies that there is a great deal of 
model variation to be explained by factors other than technical or strategic 
considerations, including characteristics of the founding team. 
Founding Team Characteristics 
There is a long-standing stream of research suggesting that organizational 
founders exert a powerful and lasting influence on the firms that they create 
(Boeker 1988; DiMaggio 1991; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1990; Schein 
1983). Furthermore, there is ample empirical evidence supporting the con-
tention that top management team characteristics are powerful predictors of 
organizational features (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996; Fligstein 1987). 
Obviously, prior experience is likely to be related to organization-building 
models (Cooper 1985). With experience comes knowledge of different orga-
nizational models as well as an appreciation for how employees fare under 
different alternatives. Archival sources, including newspaper and magazine 
articles, internal company documents, and published directories, were used to 
gather career history information for each founding team member. The career 
history data were used to identify three types of experience: prior founding 
experience, senior management experience, and nontechnical (sales, market-
ing, finance, or administrative) experience, all of which are likely to lead 
founders away from industry-dominant models. Senior management experi-
ence is defined as holding a title of vice president or higher prior to founding 
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the focal firm. Prior founding experience is likely to be undercounted in these 
sources, however, since successful ventures tend to be mentioned in executive 
biographies whereas failures do not. 
There are two mechanisms by which experience leads to deviance: confidence 
and exposure to alternatives. Experienced founders who have either founded a 
firm in the past and/or held senior executive positions have presumably had the 
benefit of operating under at least one model and may feel confident in their 
ability to construct or invent a model that suits them. By analogy, first-time par-
ents are more likely to raise their child by the book than are experienced parents. 
Exposure to alternative models may also liberate founders to deviate from the 
industry norm. Founders with nontechnical backgrounds are more likely to have 
had experience in other industries and therefore will be less well socialized to the 
dominant industry model. Similarly, founders who have held senior manage-
ment roles are likely to have held positions in multiple firms and thus may have 
experience with multiple employment models. 
Hypothesis 2: Firms founded by experienced teams will be more likely to 
deviate from the industry dominant model 
Experience need not be embodied in a single founder but, rather, can be the 
aggregate experience of all members of the founding team. In the SPEC sam-
ple, the size and composition of the founding team, as well as how the team 
members came together, varied dramatically across the sample. Founding 
teams ranged in size from one to twelve. A relatively small fraction (15.9%) 
were founded by a solo entrepreneur. The most typical SPEC firms were 
founded by two (32.3%), three (22.6%), or four (14.6%) people. The remain-
ing firms (14.6%) were founded by teams of five or more. One of the most 
striking features of the founders in this sample is the diversity of experience. 
The majority of the firms had at least one member of the founding team with 
technical experience (76.2%). Just over half of the firms (55.4%) had at least 
one team member who had earlier held a senior management position (vice 
president or higher) in another company. Roughly one-third of the firms 
(36.9%) had at least one founder who had prior start-up experience. Fewer 
than one-third of the firms had a founder with experience in either sales 
(29.8%) or finance (10.7%). 
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External Partners 
It is often asserted that interorganizational relationships are important deter-
minants of organizational characteristics (e.g., Haunschild 1994). Firms scan 
the environment and adopt organizational features that others have adopted. 
This process of organizational imitation is accelerated when there are network 
ties linking firms (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). While most of the empirical 
research on this topic has assessed the diffusion of organizational structures and 
practices, it is reasonable to assume that the same processes operate in the 
diffusion of employment models. Furthermore, the influence of significant 
others is likely to be dramatic in very young firms, given their lack of legiti-
macy and need for resources (Nohria 1992). External partners, such as venture 
capitalists, who help bring cash to new firms, may be important influences on 
the structure of new firms (Suchman 1994). 
Hypothesis 3: Firms whose important external partners include venture 
capitalists will be less likely to deviate from the dominant industry model. 
As described above, founders were asked in a written survey about the 
external partners and advisors who were involved in the founding. The survey 
item asked the respondent to list "important actors and the roles they played 
in the founding process." Beyond listing the members of the founding team, 
respondents identified 12 types of external partners: four types of investors 
(venture capitalists, private investors, corporate investors, other), lawyers, 
accountants, board members, customers, employees, friends or family, previ-
ous employers, and other advisors. The frequencies of different types of exter-
nal partners are reported in Table 2.6. 
In Table 2.6, partners have been aggregated for each firm so that each type 
of partnership variable has a discrete yes-or-no value. In other words, the vari-
ables simply indicate whether the founder mentioned any individuals who ful-
filled a particular role.4 While lawyer, board member, and venture capitalist are 
the most frequently mentioned categories of external partnership, each was 
4. This coding does not account for either multiple roles by a single individual, such as a venture cap-
italist who is also an advisor and a board member, or for multiple individuals playing a single role, 
as is the case when a respondent listed several private investors. 
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Table 2.6 
Frequency of Different Types of 
External Partners Among SPEC Sample Firms 
Partner Role 
Investors 
Venture capital 
Private 
Corporate 
Other 
Lawyers 
Board members 
Advisors 
Accountants 
Customers 
Employees 
Friends and family 
Previous employer 
Number of Firms 
89 
59 
30 
23 
3 
62 
59 
57 
15 
13 
11 
6 
5 
Percent of Firms 
77.4% 
51.3% 
26.1% 
20.0% 
2.6% 
53.9% 
51.3% 
49.6% 
13.0% 
11.3% 
9.6% 
5.2% 
4.3% 
listed by just over half of the firms (53.9%, 51.3%, and 51.3% of the firms, 
respectively). Similarly, advisors were mentioned by 49.6% of the firms. Other 
types of partners were mentioned less frequendy. It is worth noting that part-
nership types seem to cluster. A simple similarity ratio computed from a cor-
relation-type matrix reveals that venture capitalist, lawyer, advisor, and board 
member tend to be co-present.5 
ANALYSES 
Multinomial logistic regression analyses were used to examine conformity to 
and deviance from the dominant industry model. The empirical strategy dis-
tinguishes, at one extreme, those firms that adopt their industry's model and, 
at the other extreme, those firms that are not adopting any of the five basic 
employment models (nor anything conceptually close to any of the five basic 
5. This analysis used a Jaccard measure for binary variables. This is an index based on a 2 X 2 table 
of variable 1 (present, absent) crossed by variable 2 (present, absent). In the Jaccard measure, joint 
absences are excluded from consideration and equal weight is given to matches and nonmatches. 
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types) and are two or more dimensions from the dominant industry model. 
The intermediate category, described as variants, includes the firms that are 
founded under a basic employment model or are within one dimension of the 
dominant industry model. This empirical strategy was driven by an interest in 
identifying the sources of novel organizational forms, which occurs when 
firms are founded with extremely deviant employment models. The analytic 
strategy allows novelty (deviance) to be distinguished empirically from well-
understood archetypal employment models or models that are conceptually 
close to such models. Industry-dummy variables were included to control for 
the different strengths of the industry-specific dominant models. As shown 
above, the greatest propensity to conform to an industry template was evident 
in the electronics industry, while firms in the medical-related industry were 
most likely to be founded with a basic (or near) star model. A substantial num-
ber of firms were organized with an engineering model. In contrast, the only 
basic model that is apparent in the SPEC manufacturing firms is the com-
mitment model. Furthermore, the firms founded with nonbasic models are 
more likely to be distant from the commitment model (three firms are two or 
more dimensions from commitment) than they are to be close to it (two firms 
are only one dimension from commitment). 
To account for two potential sources of heterogeneity—initial scale and 
idiosyncratic time variations from things like short-term labor market fluctu-
ations—we included a measure of the firm size (the natural logarithm of the 
number of employees at the end of the first year of operations) and the age of 
the firm when we first interviewed the founder. 
RESULTS 
Table 2.7 presents the results of a multinomial logistic regression predicting the 
initial employment model. The baseline (omitted) category is for firms con-
forming to their industry's dominant model. The two panels in the table rep-
resent the varying degrees of deviance from the normative prescription. The 
first panel represents the most extreme deviance, in which firms adopt a model 
that is conceptually distant from both the dominant model and the four alter-
native archetypes. The second panel represents variants, more modest devia-
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Table 2.7 
Multinomial Logistic Regression Predicting Deviation from 
Industry-Dominant Model (N = 123) 
(omitted category = industry-dominant model) 
Deviant: Model Is Two or More Dimensions 
from the Industry-Dominant Model 
Model 1 
Coffiicient 
(standard error) 
Model 2 
Coefficient 
(standard error) 
Initial organizational size 
Age 
Medical or research industry 
Manufacturing industry 
Nontechnology strategy 
Number of founders 
Number of founders with 
finance, sales, or marketing experience 
Number of founders with 
senior management experience 
Constant 
-0.19 
(0.42) 
-0.32 + 
(0.20) 
0.73 
(1.35) 
1.15 
(1.21) 
3.22f 
(1.22) 
-1.52 
(1.92) 
-0.69 
(0.52) 
-0.27 
(0.20) 
0.82 
(1.66) 
3-21* 
(1.64) 
3.79f 
(1.56) 
-1.09 
(0.68) 
1.50" 
(0.81) 
1.39* 
(0.68) 
-1.27 
(2.29) 
(continued) 
tions, in which the founders have avoided the dominant model but have 
adopted a model that is (or is close to) one of the four archetypes. Model 1 
includes only technical and environmental determinants of the employment 
model. Model 2 adds characteristics of the founding team. The results indi-
cate that much of the tendency toward nonstandard employment models can 
be explained by differences in strategy, supporting hypothesis 1. This is par-
ticularly true when the firm dramatically deviates from the industry's dominant 
model. 
An interesting and unanticipated finding is that, controlling for functional 
ng Deviation from 
I = 123) 
model) 
1 
ent 
error) 
9 
2) 
2 + 
0) 
3 
5) 
5 
0 
lc 
I) 
) 
Model 2 
Coefficient 
(standard error) 
-0.69 
(0.52) 
-0 .27 
(0.20) 
0.82 
(1.66) 
3.21* 
(1.64) 
3.79' 
(1.56) 
-1.09 
(0.68) 
1.50" 
(0.81) 
1.39* 
(0.68) 
-1 .27 
(2.29) 
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Table 2.7 (continued) 
Variant: One of the Four Other Archetypal 
Models or Within One Dimension of the 
Industry-Dominant Model 
Initial organizational size 
Age 
Medical or research industry 
Manufacturing industry 
Nontechnology strategy 
Number of founders 
Number of founders with 
finance, sales, or marketing experience 
Number of founders with 
senior management experience 
Constant 
Model chi-square 
Degrees of freedom 
Model 1 
Coefficient 
(standard error) 
-0.19 
(0.19) 
0.05 
(0.07) 
-0.75 
(0.52) 
-0.94 
(1.07) 
0.38 
(0.49) 
0.81 
(0.76) 
24.89f 
10 
Model 2 
Coefficient 
(standard error) 
-0.15 
(0.21) 
0.06 
(0.08) 
-0.67 
(0.55) 
-0.76 
(1.08) 
0.23 
(0.50) 
-0.25* 
(0-12) 
0.33 
(0.28) 
0.05 
(0.20) 
1.18 
(0.83) 
37.07f 
16 
NOTE: + p < .15; ap < .10; p < .05; cp < .01 
heterogeneity, larger teams are less likely to deviate from the dominant indus-
try model. This coefficient is a statistically significant predictor of modest 
deviations and is close to being statistically significant (p = 0.11) for more dra-
matic deviations. One plausible explanation for these findings is rooted in 
group dynamics. Developing an initial employment model in a group setting 
may require that all parties converge. It is highly likely that through a process 
of consensus building and compromising, the emergent model will closely 
resemble a dominant industry model. 
The most intriguing finding is that there are key experience differences 
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among those founding teams whose initial employment model differs dra-
matically from the industry archetype. Founding teams with more senior 
management experience and more nontechnical experience (controlling for the 
total number of founders) are the most likely to deviate from the dominant 
industry model, net of strategic considerations, supporting hypothesis 2. In 
other words, experienced executives who are part of a functionally well-
rounded founding team are the most likely to adopt an employment model 
that is different from either the dominant industry model or any other well-
understood cultural archetype. An interpretation of this finding is that those 
firms that begin with functionally heterogeneous teams do so because they 
differ in the complexity or diversity of their operations. This diversity may have 
implications for which model is most appropriate, and it may require deviat-
ing from an industry's dominant model. An alternative explanation for the 
finding is that it is driven by the presence of industry outsiders. Comparing 
two founding teams of the same size, a team that includes broad business expe-
rience (senior management, finance, sales, or marketing) has a higher proba-
bility of drawing on industry outsiders than one of primarily technical 
founders. An interesting topic for future research is determining the conse-
quences of adopting a novel model. 
In other analyses of the survey data, I tested hypothesis 3, on the role of 
external partners, such as lawyers and venture capitalists. As Table 2.8 shows, 
although there are bivariate associations between having a venture capitalist 
as an important partner and adopting a particular employment model, in 
multivariate analyses that included dummy variables to indicate whether 
either a lawyer or a venture capitalist was listed as a partner, neither coefficient 
was statistically significant. Furthermore, including the variables did not 
change the results described above. I omit them from the reported results 
because they decrease the usable sample (54 cases are dropped due to miss-
ing partner data). 
One possible explanation of the lack of effect for the influence of external 
partners is that, as posited above, the salience of particular external actors may 
vary both by industry and by strategy. It is also possible that external influences 
are not directly in the form of partner relationships but, rather, are indirect, 
coming through more subtle mechanisms such as executive migration (Boeker 
1997) or broader field-level conflicts and contests (Ventresca and Washington 
Association 
Partner 
Private investor 
(N = 30) 
Venture capitalist 
(N = 59) 
Corporate investor 
(N = 23) 
Other investor 
(N = 3) 
Lawyer 
(N = 62) 
Advisor 
(N = 57) 
Accountant 
( N = 1 5 ) 
Board member 
(N = 59) 
Customer 
( N = 1 3 ) 
Founder 
(N = 34) 
Employee 
( N = l l ) 
Kin 
(N = 6) 
Previous company 
(N = 5) 
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(3 
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Table 2.8 
Association Between External Influences and Employment Model 
Partner 
Autocracy 
N=7 
(6.3%) 
Commitment Star Engineering 
N= 12 N= 13 N=41 
(10.7%) (11.6%) (36.6%) 
Bureaucracy Other Likelihood Ratio 
N=5 N=34 Chi-sauare 
(4.5%) (30.4%) (5 di.) 
Private investor 
(N = 30) 
Venture capitalist 
(N = 59) 
Corporate investor 
(N = 23) 
Other investor 
(N = 3) 
Lawyer 
(N = 62) 
Advisor 
(N = 57) 
Accountant 
(N=15) 
Board member 
(N = 59) 
Customer 
(N = 13) 
Founder 
(N = 34) 
Employee 
(N = ll) 
Kin 
(N = 6) 
Previous company 
(N = 5) 
1 
(3.4%) 
2 
(3.4%) 
2 
(9.1%) 
1 
(33.3%) 
2 
(3.3%) 
1 
(1.9%) 
1 
(7.1%) 
5 
(8.5%) 
1 
(7.7%) 
3 
(9.1%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
1 
(16.7%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
3 
(10.3%) 
4 
(6.9%) 
2 
(9.1%) 
1 
(33.3%) 
3 
(5.0%) 
5 
(9.4%) 
2 
(14.3%) 
8 
(13.6%) 
1 
(7.7%) 
6 
(18.2%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
3 
(50.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
6 
(20.7%) 
7 
(12.1%) 
3 
(13.6%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
6 
(10.0%) 
7 
(12.5%) 
1 
(7.1%) 
4 
(6.8%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
3 
(9.1%) 
2 
(18.2%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
1 
(25.0%) 
10 
(34.5%) 
23 
(39.7%) 
9 
(40.9%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
25 
(41.7%) 
25 
(44.6%) 
6 
(42.9%) 
24 
(40.7%) 
6 
(46.2%) 
12 
(36.4%) 
5 
(45.5%) 
1 
(16.7%) 
2 
(50.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
5 
(8.6%) 
2 
(9.1%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
4 
(67%) 
4 
(7.1%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
2 
(3.4%) 
1 
(7.7%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
0 
(0.0%) 
9 
(31.0%) 
17 
(29.3%) 
4 
(18.2%) 
1 
(33.3%) 
20 
(33.3%) 
14 
(25.0%) 
4 
(28.6%) 
16 
(39.0%) 
4 
(30.8%) 
9 
(27.3%) 
4 
(36.4%) 
1 
(16.7%) 
1 
(25.0%) 
6.08 
10.16" 
3.22 
5.99 
8.96 
9.36* 
2.02 
5.86 
4.02 
6.69 
5.74 
9.13" 
2.46 
NOTE: ap<.10 
1998). Another interesting possibility is that external partnerships may be 
most important when founders lack experience or legitimacy, as do founders 
who are young scientists or engineers. These founders are most likely to adopt 
an industry dominant model and are least likely to have venture backing. The 
process of choosing that model may or may not be related to the influence of 
external partners. 
36 I BURTON 
DISCUSSION 
This research raises two broad issues related to organizational models and 
entrepreneurship. First, treatments of entrepreneurial strategy have tended to 
focus exclusively on the product or financing domains. If we are to take seri-
ously the organization-building side of entrepreneurial strategy, however, we 
must consider both the options available to entrepreneurs (e.g., the labor 
markets in which they compete) and the available models for organizing. Sec-
ond, understanding strategic organization-building choices may require alter-
native conceptualizations. 
This research concentrates on models used by entrepreneurs to guide the 
ways in which they build their firms. There is evidence that dominant mod-
els of the employment relationship vary among industries, even within the rel-
atively homogenous high-technology sector. There is also strong evidence of 
considerable variation around the dominant models. This chapter begins to 
explore the sources of variation in the models. The evidence presented here 
indicates that strategy matters: firms pursuing a nontechnology strategy are 
more likely to deviate from the dominant industry model than are firms that 
are pursuing a more purely technical path. Further, the demographic compo-
sition of the founding team makes a difference. Smaller founding teams are 
more likely to deviate from an industry-dominant model as are teams whose 
members have backgrounds in finance, sales, or marketing or that include 
founders with senior-level management experience. 
At a minimum, the findings reported here suggest that broad interpretations 
of institutional theory particularly, and organizational theory more generally, 
may systematically underestimate the patterned variation in organizational 
models present in a given field. Entrepreneurs do not appear to be overly con-
strained by overarching cultural pressures, as represented in institutional the-
ory, or by the expectations of those people and other firms on whom they 
depend, as in resource dependence theory, or by the technical requirements of 
the task. Rather, entrepreneurs with broader business experience may in fact 
devise novel organizational forms that resonate with particular business strate-
gies or that are consistent with their own personal values (DiMaggio 1991; 
Fombrun 1988). 
A second issue raised by this research concerns the strategic use of models 
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of the employment relation. Deviant employment models may be mistakes, 
and they may result from founders being disconnected, but they do not appear 
to stem from a lack of experience. Instead, it appears that novel employment 
models are tolerated when the founding team has extensive experience, both 
across functions and at the highest level of organizations. It is these seasoned 
professionals who are credibly able to devise their own employment model. 
The second alternative is that nonstandard employment models reflect 
deliberate strategic choices by entrepreneurs trying to differentiate their firm 
in the labor market. Although this explanation finds some support here, the 
factors appear to be more complex than is typically imagined (e.g., Sonnen-
feld and Peiperl 1988). The interviews with founders revealed clearly that some 
entrepreneurs truly operated in default mode in building their organizations, 
reporting that they didn't give any attention to such issues. Other founders 
reported that they operated quite deliberately in choosing models of the 
employment relation and in initial organization building. Among the latter 
were two types. Some founders chose models for ideological reasons; they 
reported strong beliefs in the intrinsic value of the models they implemented 
and made no reference to performance implications or consequences. Others 
reported that their choice of model was based on business rationales about 
which models can attract key personnel in the current labor market or about 
the link between model and product strategy, with an eye toward improving 
the organizations' competitive chances or enhancing performance. Table 2.9 
provides some illustrative quotes for each of these approaches. 
The co-existence of these three modes of choosing models has potentially 
important consequences that have not yet been explored. For example, these 
different modes may influence the amount of diversity in the community of 
organizations. The default mode will tend to reproduce the dominant indus-
try mode, especially when new ventures are guided by relatively large teams of 
technical founders. Such a process will produce stability over time within 
industries and maintain differences between industries, particularly when 
there is little cross-industry mobility among executives. The ideological mode 
would likely increase the variance within industries. The interviews revealed 
a strong oppositional component in the ideological mode: entrepreneurs 
expressed considerable distaste for the models used in the firms with which 
they had experience and a desire to create an organization that was the polar 
Table 2.9 
Sample Statements Illustrating Different Approaches to 
Choosing an Employment Model 
Unintended/Default Ideological Strategic 
We did not really spend a lot of 
time on organization. Not be-
cause its not important, but 
because you are in survival mode 
and it's like a platoon, it's not an 
army. You're thinking like a pla-
toon, you're a command opera-
tion, and you know that you 
are, and you don't worry about 
it, because you're not an army. 
So don't try to be like an army, 
because you'll be a very lousy 
platoon. (19) 
The culture was a de facto cul-
ture of hard work and long 
hours. Not much of a culture. 
(3) 
Absolutely zero plan [for the 
employment relationship]. The 
biggest things on our minds 
were customers and products. 
We started paying deeper atten-
tion when we crossed the 50-
people barrier. (110) 
The initial plan or blueprint 
was to be different than the typ-
ical Silicon Valley company. We 
were not looking to establish a 
"get rich quick" company. We 
wanted to follow an Eastern 
model of treating people well. 
And we didn't want to grow at 
the expense of our people. (1) 
We wanted a strong participa-
tory culture with an enormous 
amount of ground up informa-
tion, not only from the manage-
ment team, but also the people 
on the floor. (23) 
I wanted to build a company 
that walked its talk. A company 
that mistreats its suppliers, for 
instance, but says it treats its 
customers well is lying. You 
have to build partners inside 
and build partners for your sup-
pliers and partners for your cus-
tomers. You can't do that if the 
basic culture of the company 
is "I just want to get rich and 
screw you." And what I've just 
described is probably closer to 
the Silicon Valley norm. (132) 
The two key determinants of 
early success for biotechnology 
companies are science and capi-
tal. The best scientists attract 
investors and capital, and capi-
tal attracts good scientists. The 
two complement and enforce 
each other, and you need both 
to succeed. That's it. Inadequate 
funding leads to bad science 
because you can't attract the 
best people. You won't attract 
or retain the best people because 
they can go somewhere that has 
the money, and they will. Sec-
ondly, when you start without 
the money, you start cutting 
corners. You have no choice. 
That ultimately comes back to 
bite you in the rear end. (104) 
We know our size, our name, 
our business won't attract any 
top-notch people. So you have 
to use your relationships. People 
who know you can be success-
ful. They believe in you more 
than they believe in the 
business. (39) 
Basically, to work for us you 
have to be really, really good 
and you have to be willing to 
work for pretty much nothing. 
That eliminates all but the 
fanatics. People who come in 
here to work for us get lots of 
advantages. Mostly we hire 
engineers, people who make 
products. The ability to come 
in and write a product from the 
ground up that's your baby, and 
that's going to sell, and you'll 
have influence all the way 
through, from the design to art-
work to packaging to distribu-
tion, is rare. (164) 
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opposite. Such a mode will tend to increase the variance of organizational 
models within industries, assuming that entrepreneurs tend to remain within 
the same industries. The strategic mode is also likely to increase variability 
within industries. The most interesting case involves the strategic choice of 
organizational models directed toward attaining a distinctive position in the 
labor market. If entrepreneurs follow this logic, they will tend to move away 
from the dominant industry models and thereby increase the variance in mod-
els within industries. 
Within the academy, there is strong consensus that organizational diversity 
is important and valuable. The value of heterogeneous organizational forms 
has been linked to public policy (Van de Ven and Garud 1989), industry 
dynamics (Delacroix, Swaminathan, and Solt 1989), organizational viability 
(Hannan and Freeman 1989), and individual career mobility (Carroll, Have-
man, and Swaminathan 1992; Hannan 1988). Yet despite this consensus, 
there is still relatively little research that addresses the sources of organizational 
diversity. In this small sample of technology start-ups in Silicon Valley there 
is startling variation in founders' employment models, even among start-up 
companies in the same industry, competing directly against one another. This 
chapter is only a first step toward understanding the factors that create this 
diversity. There is still much work to be done. 
